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IN RECENT YEARS many financial  service firms  in the United States and 
other industrialized  countries  have not prospered.  Public  confidence  in 
the health of the U.S. banking  system has declined as bank losses and 
failures have increased throughout  the 1980s. Yet the record of U.S. 
banks, aside from their reported  failures, is not so different  from those 
in other  countries.  Banking  troubles  are not uniquely  American. 
In the past fifteen years banking  and other financial  service markets 
have undergone  fundamental  changes. In many cases national  markets 
have moved  from  relatively  stable  environments,  in which  various  types 
of firms operated in segmented markets protected by high regulatory 
barriers,  to more fluid  environments,  in which market  barriers  are less 
restrictive and thus promote greater competition. The changes were 
often implemented through moves  away from a relationship-based 
system of financial  intermediation  to one in which  explicit market-based 
transactions  predominated. 
This basic change in the nature  of banking  systems was encouraged 
in many cases  by  national deregulatory initiatives. Many of  these 
initiatives  were associated with the removal of official sponsorship  for 
deposit and loan pricing  conventions. The initiatives  have also resulted 
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in fewer formal partitions  of powers among various types of financial 
service firms.' A comparison  of different countries reveals that more 
partitions  now exist in the United States and Japan  than in European 
countries. 
The competitive environment  for financial services has also been 
influenced  by a number  of other factors. In particular,  lower communi- 
cation and information  processing  costs have reduced  the relative cost 
of writing  and pricing  customized  financial  contracts, such as over-the- 
counter  foreign  currency  and interest  rate options. Such contracts  have 
frequently served to  differentiate the offerings available from new 
entrants to banking markets from those available from established 
competitors.  It has been a recurring  pattern  in national  banking  markets 
that the availability  of such offerings has made it increasingly  difficult 
for traditional  bank clubs to coordinate member banks' behaviors in 
both old (deposit  and loan) and new (state-contingent)  financial  product 
markets. 
It is now widely  accepted  that  national  reform  efforts  will not coalesce 
around a single model, such as the universal bank model of Europe. 
Current  reform  proposals  in the United States and Japan,  for instance, 
do not  follow this  model.  Furthermore,  it is also highly  likely  that  national 
legal structures  will continue  to reflect  differences  in national  judgments 
concerning  the responsibilities  that can be prudently  assigned  to banks: 
in the United States and the United Kingdom,  it has been a basic tenet 
that a bank with an equity interest in another  firm  should  be presumed 
incapable  of dispassionate analysis of that firm's creditworthiness;  in 
countries  with  universal  banking  traditions,  the presumption  is reversed. 
An important  element of financial  structure  concerns the rules under 
which a firm's  operations  are continued  or discontinued.  In the United 
States and the United Kingdom,  bankruptcy  rules deter banks that are 
well informed  about  a troubled  firm  from  controlling  that  firm's  refinanc- 
ing. In  Germany  and  Japan,  banks  often  organize  refinancing  for  troubled 
firms through informal  processes. Previous studies have often over- 
looked such fundamental  differences in the national  roles assigned to 
banks and have instead  focused on differences  in more visible elements 
of bank regulation, such as reserve requirements  and interest rate 
1. Germany  and  Morton  (1985)  provide  an earlier  discussion  of some of the changes  in 
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regulations. In this paper we expressly study the link between bank 
structure  and  bank  performance  in  the  hope  of informing  the international 
debate  about  financial-market  reform. 
Among previous efforts at reform, one international  endeavor by 
bank supervisors of major industrial  countries, which was called the 
Basle Accord, was an explicit attempt to erode national differences 
through  the introduction  of uniform  minimum  capital  requirements  for 
internationally  active banks. The emphasis on capital as the most 
important supervisory focus  has been carried forward in the U.S. 
Treasury's  recent proposals  for financial  reform  in the United States.2 
We believe, however, that a convergence  of national  policies on capital 
regulation  will not necessarily ensure more fundamental  alignments  of 
bank  roles internationally. 
The methodology adopted in this paper is eclectic. A comparative 
analysis of banking  systems is a research  area where quantitative  data 
are difficult to interpret-when  they are available at all. The major 
economic role of banks is to make transactions  that cannot easily be 
made in open, standardized  markets. Such transactions  are not easily 
analyzed  using summary  statistics. We examine  the statistical  evidence 
that  is available,  but we also rely on less formal  information  on financial 
structure.  We hope to produce  from  these disparate  sources a synthesis 
that draws reliable conclusions when possible and, when conclusions 
are not possible, marks those areas that invite further research. We 
believe this approach  may help show which  elements  of the U.S. system 
contribute to  its efficiency and stability and may also explain the 
international  competitive  pressures  facing U.S. banks. 
We begin our analysis of national  banking  systems by comparing  the 
performances  of the banking  systems in Germany,  Japan, the United 
Kingdom,  and the United States. Because the measurement  of banking 
performance  is very difficult,  we select statistics that  cast some light  on 
the relative performance  of systems both across time and between 
countries. The data, while subject to some limitations,  do allow some 
conclusions  regarding  differences  in bank  performance. 
In the second section of this paper, we explore the characteristic 
structures of each national banking system and also describe each 
country's  regulatory  structures,  including  their practices regarding  de- 
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posit insurance,  interest  rates, asset restrictions,  and  restrictions  on the 
scope of activities in which banks may engage. We then consider the 
degree of competition within different national banking markets, the 
nature  of bank  relationships  with customers, and the legal environment 
in different  countries,  especially with respect to bankruptcy. 
In the third  section, we bring  all these elements together  in an effort 
to explain disparate  banking  performances.  We argue that regulatory 
differences do not entirely explain performance  differences. Instead, 
how banks  form  and  preserve  customer  relationships  plays an important 
role, as does the degree  of competition.  Given  the difficulty  in measuring 
performance, this link between structure and performance is  only 
incompletely  drawn. 
In the final section, we assess what foreign experiences can teach 
U.S.  policymakers  about structural  reform in the United States. We 
examine  this question  from  the perspectives  of efficiency  and stability. 
Measuring Bank Performance 
This section  examines  statistics  pertaining  to the health  of the banking 
industry  in  Germany,  Japan,  the United  Kingdom,  and  the United  States. 
It also considers  several measures  of the impact  of each banking  system 
on the rest of that country's economy. While we must interpret  these 
statistics  with care, several conclusions emerge. 
The first set of conclusions concerns time-series data on our four 
countries. In the United States, the health of the banking  system has 
deteriorated  over the past twenty years. This deterioration  has been 
accompanied  by the development  of sophisticated  new financial  instru- 
ments, as well as by a substantial  increase in the number  of corporate 
bankruptcies, a phenomenon that has also occurred in the United 
Kingdom.  Banks  in Germany  and  Japan,  however, have expanded  more 
rapidly  over this period  than  have banks  in the United Kingdom  and  the 
United States. 
A second  set of conclusions  utilizes  cross-sectional  data.  Banks  supply 
a smaller  percentage  of total corporate  finance  in the United States than 
in other countries. British and Japanese banks appear  to be the most 
profitable,  although  different  accounting  practices  cloud this issue. The 
profits  of German  and  Japanese  banks  appear  the most stable. And large Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  261 
Figure 1. Bond Ratings of Major U.S. Banks, 1974-90 
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Source: Moody's Investor  Services. The horizontal  line denotes the annual  average  of Moody's senior bond 
ratings  for nine major  U.S. money-center  bank  holding  companies.  The vertical  lines show the range  of ratings  for 
a given year. The sample  consists of nine companies  from 1978  on, and fewer in preceding  years because fewer 
companies  received  bond  ratings. 
a. Bond ratings  are assigned  numerical  scores based on a letter-based  credit rating  system. The highest  letter 
grade  (for example,  AAA) is assigned  a value  of 1, the next level a 2, and so on. 
U.S. banks  appear  to be in poorer  health  than  their  counterparts  in other 
countries, at least judging from a comparison of their bond ratings. 
Finally, corporate  investment  fluctuates  much less in Japan  than in the 
other  countries. 
Examining  these issues in greater  detail, we turn  first  to the deterio- 
ration  in the health  of American  banks. Figure  1  shows the average  bond 
ratings of nine major money-center bank holding companies in the 
United States since 1974. The bond ratings of these firms worsened 
greatly over the 1980s, with the deterioration  initiated  by the interna- 
tional debt crisis of the early 1980s. Ratings continued to deteriorate 
through  1990;  between 1981  and 1990,  average  ratings  improved  in only 
one year, 1989. This deterioration  may be partly a function of bank 
holding  companies' having  issued more bonds, thus increasing  the risk 
to any one bondholder.  However, bank  issuance of bonds peaked  in the 
mid-1980s in response to  supervisory concerns about bank capital 
positions. That bond ratings continued to  slide suggests a genuine 
deterioration  in the health of the banks and not simply the effects of 262  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1991 
Figure 2.  Bank Failures in the United States, 1934-90 
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Source: Federal  Deposit  Insurance  Corporation  (1990);  the 1990  figure  is an unpublished  number  from  the FDIC. 
a. The total nominal  assets of the failed  banks  have been deflated  by the GNP implicit  price deflator  using 1982 
as the base year. 
more bonds on the market.  Figure 1 also shows that the range  of bond 
ratings  has expanded  over time. 
One potential  flaw in using these bond ratings  is that the data cover 
only large  money-center  bank  holding  companies. These companies, in 
contrast  to smaller  regional  banks,  were heavily  involved  in  Third  World 
debt. Another  possible flaw  is that  the value of the bonds  of a large  bank 
holding  company  could decline not only in response to the deteriorating 
conditions  of banks  but also if the market  perceives that the authorities 
were more  likely to allow that holding  company  to fail. 
However, other measures  that take in a broader  set of banks corro- 
borate  the conclusion  that  the  health  of American  banks  has  deteriorated. 
Figure 2 displays the number  and aggregate  size of failures of FDIC- 
insured  banks in the United States since the inception of the FDIC in 
1934.  The number  of bank  failures  rose sharply  throughout  the 1980s.  In 
1982,  more  than  40 U.S. banks  failed, the largest  number  since 1940.  In 
1985, 120  banks  failed, more  than  in any other year since the FDIC was 
founded, and the number  grew still larger  between 1985  and 1989,  when 
206  banks  failed. The year 1990  saw a dip in the number,  with 168  banks Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  263 
Table 1.  Outstanding Interest Rate and Currency Swaps,  1987-89 
Billions  of dollars 
Type  of swap  1987  1988  1989 
Interest rate swaps  682  1,010  1,503 
Currency swaps  184  320  449 
Source: Bank for International  Settlements  (1991, pp. 72-73). The table shows the end-of-year  outstanding 
worldwide  value  of the notional  principal  of interest  rate  and  currency  swaps, which  are the hypothetical  underlying 
amounts  on which  swap  payments  are based.  Figures  include  values  for all counterparties,  including  interbank,  end- 
user, and brokered  swaps. 
failing.  The total assets of failed banks, adjusted  for inflation,  reached  a 
peak in 1988. 
Informal  evidence suggests  that  the nature  of banking  has  also changed 
greatly  in recent years, especially in the United States, but also in other 
countries. Banks have reportedly turned from offering standardized 
loans to customers  with whom they have developed long-term  relation- 
ships to engaging  in more  market-oriented  transactions  using  derivative 
securities. Quantitative  evidence of this trend is scarce. It is clear, 
however, that markets for derivative financial products have grown 
rapidly  during  the past decade. Table 1  provides  evidence for the growth 
of one such market.  It shows that the notional  principal  of outstanding 
currency  and interest  rate swaps has grown  rapidly,  even between 1987 
and 1989.3  The amount of swaps outstanding worldwide more than 
doubled over these two years, reaching  a total principal  of roughly $2 
trillion. 
Figure  3 shows that  in the 1980s  the number  of corporate  bankruptcies 
increased  greatly  in both the United States and the United Kingdom.  In 
both countries, the number  of bankruptcies  in 1989  was approximately 
twice that  of 1975.  By contrast,  the number  of bankruptcies  in Germany 
and in Japan  has shown no clear upward  trend.4  As we discuss later in 
3. A swap is a financial  transaction  in which two counterparties  agree to exchange 
streams  of payments  over time according  to a predetermined  rule. A swap is normally 
used  to transform  the market  exposure  associated  with  a loan  or bond  borrowing  from  one 
interest  rate  base (an interest  rate swap)  or currency  of denomination  (a currency  swap) 
to another.  The term "notional  principal"  refers to the hypothetical  amount  on which 
swap  payments  are  based. 
4.  Our data are broad measures of corporate  bankruptcies  in the four countries. 
However, our concept of bankruptcy  differs  from country  to country;  thus the data are 
not strictly  comparable  across countries. 264  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Figure 3.  Relative Levels of Corporate Bankruptcies  in Four Industrialized 
Countries, 1975-89 
Bankruptcy  indexa 
300 
250  United  Kingdom  United  States 
200- 
150- 
100  ,  _  /  .  -  -  s  Germany 
50  I  I  I  1  1 
1975  1977  1979  1981  1983  1985  1987  1989 
Sources: Corporate  bankruptcies  in Japan  involving  liabilities  of more than 10 million yen are from Monthly 
Statistics of Japanz, January  1991;  corporate  bankruptcies  in Germany  are from Statistisches  Jahrbuch  fur die 
Buindesrepuiblik  Deutschland,  various  editions;  company  compulsory  insolvencies  in the United  Kingdom  are from 
Financial  Statistics;  and business  bankruptcies  in the United  States  are from  the Federal  Reserve. 
a. An index  of corporate  bankruptcies  in each country  is shown, with  the number  of bankruptcies  in 1975  =  100 
in each country.  Cross-country  comparisons  of the absolute  number  of bankruptcies  were not considered  meaningful 
because  of the differences  in national  definitions  of bankruptcies. 
the paper,  the bankruptcy  regime  differs  greatly  between  these two pairs 
of countries. Formal bankruptcy  proceedings tend to be replaced in 
Germany  and  Japan  by informal  workouts. 
The experience  of banks  has also varied  greatly  in different  countries. 
Figure  4 shows that  the value of the assets of the largest  Japanese  banks 
has grown  rapidly  over the past twenty years. Assets of German  banks, 
too, have grown substantially  over this period, although  they started 
from  a smaller  base in 1970  than  did Japanese  banks. The assets of large 
U.S. and U.K. banks grew very little over this period. In asset terms, 
banking  markets  in 1970  were  dominated  by British  and  American  banks; 
by 1989  they were dominated  by large  Japanese  banks,  whose assets had 
become greater  than  the combined  assets of the large  banks  of the other 
three countries. 
Part  of the relatively  fast growth  in Japanese  banks can be attributed 
to the relatively  fast growth  of the Japanese  economy. Figure  5 adjusts 
for this by scaling  the assets of large  banks in the four countries  by the Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  265 
Figure 4.  Real Assets of Largest Banks in Four Industrialized  Countries, 1970-89 
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Sources: The Banker,  various  issues; and the Federal  Reserve. Thc eight largest  banks in each country  were 
determined  for each year on the basis of reported  end-of-year  assets. The assets of the eight largest  banks were 
converted  to dollars  at end-of-year  exchange  rates  and were deflated  by respective  GNP deflators  using 1980  as the 
base year, except for the U.K. figure,  which  has been deflated  by its GDP  deflator. 
GDP  of their  respective  country.  Still,  relative  to the size of the economy, 
the large U.S. banks  have grown  the slowest over the past two decades 
and have actually shrunk  since 1980. By this scaled measure, German 
banks have grown at approximately  the same rate as Japanese  banks, 
while British banks have grown more slowly. In both Germany  and 
Japan,  large  banks  have more  than  doubled  their  size relative  to GDP in 
the past twenty -years.  Thus, during  a period when U.S.  banks have 
shown little growth, German  and Japanese  banks, and to some extent 
British banks, appear  to have expanded their roles in their respective 
economies.' Certainly,  these measures  are only a rough  guide to bank 
growth; these data do not, for example, distinguish  between domestic 
and  foreign  assets of these banks. 
Another  piece of evidence on the changing  role of banks  in these four 
economies comes from  flow-of-funds  data. Figure  6 displays  the sources 
5. Japanese  land and equity prices surged  in the late 1980s. However, only a small 
portion  of the increase  in reported  bank  assets during  this period  was caused  by this surge 
in equity  and land  prices. In general,  however, the appreciation  of the value of Japanese 
stock and land prices indirectly  influenced  the size of Japanese  banks  by enhancing  the 
value  of collateral  that  could be offered  by Japanese  borrowers. 266  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Figure 5.  Assets of Largest Banks Relative to Gross Domestic Product in Four 
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Sources: The  Banker,  various  issues; and the Federal  Reserve. 
a. The index is the ratio of the assets of the eight largest  banks in each country  to the GDP in the respective 
country  with 1970 =  100.  Annual  data  for Germany,  the United  Kingdom,  and the United  States  are taken  from  the 
end of the calendar  year;  Japanese  data  are from  the end of March. 
of net external  funding  of nonfinancial  businesses for the four  countries. 
The figure  shows the percentage  of business financing  that comes from 
domestic securities markets (stocks and bonds) and from domestic 
banks.  We have averaged  these ratios  over five-year  intervals,  from  1965 
through 1989. The residual includes financing  from all other sources, 
including  governments.  The cross-country  data differ in some details. 
The figure  describes  some of these differences.  Additional  examples  are 
that the inclusion of other financial institutions, an adjustment  for 
mortgages  in the United States, or the exclusion of insurance  companies 
in Germany  does not affect  our  basic conclusions  about  the relative  roles 
of banks  in those countries. 
The data support  the frequent characterization  of the German  and 
Japanese systems as examples of bank-oriented  systems.6 Banks have 
consistently  provided  over half  of net external  finance  in both countries. 
The  proportion  of financing  through  securities  markets  decreased  in  both 
6.  See, for example,  Berglof  (1990). Figure 6.  Percent of Total Business Funds Raised through Securities and Bank 
Loans, 1965-89 
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Sources: Data are from various issues of Monthly  Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank,  Economic  Statistics 
Monthly  (Bank  of Japan),  Bank  of England  Quarterly  Review,  and  Flow  of Funds  Accounts  (Federal  Reserve  Board, 
Z. I release). 
a. U.S. figures  are for total nonfinancial  business. Bank  loans exclude mortgages  and all lending  from nonbank 
financial  intermediaries.  Securities  exclude  commercial  paper. 
b. U.K. bank  loans include  commercial  paper  and lending  by nonbank  financial  intermediaries. 
c. German  figures  are  for  "producing  enterprises,"  which  exclude  housing.  Bank  loans  include  lending  by insurance 
companies,  but not by building  societies. 
d. Japanese  figures  are for "corporate  business."  Bank  loans  include  lending  by nonbank  financial  intermediaries. 
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countries in the 1970s, though it has since increased steadily. Yet, in 
both  countries  banks  continue  to provide  more  than  twice the funds  that 
direct  securities  markets  provide.  Data  for Britain,  while less stable  than 
for  Germany  and  Japan,  show  that  there  too banks  dominate  the  provision 
of external  financing,  a finding  that counters the frequent  presumption 
that the United Kingdom has a market-oriented  system of corporate 
finance. 
These three countries contrast sharply  with the United States. Be- 
tween 1965 and 1979, securities markets provided more financing  to 
American  firms  than  did  banks.  In the 1980s  the situation  reversed  itself: 
net securities  financing  decreased  sharply,  turning  negative  in  the second 
half of the decade, while bank financing  increased as a proportion  of 
total financing. This apparent reversal in the role of banks and of 
securities  markets  reflects  a period  of extensive corporate  restructurings, 
in which firms  borrowed  heavily from  banks  and  from  other  institutions 
(partly  through  junk bonds) in order to buy back their publicly traded 
stock. Despite this twist at the end of the sample  period,  however, bank 
financing  was still a much smaller proportion  of total financing  in the 
United States-never  more than 30 percent-than  in the other three 
countries. 
Figures  7 and  8  compare  the  levels and  variabilities  of bank  profitability 
across countries. We use two different  measures  of profitability:  return 
on assets and  return  on equity. By either  measure,  British  banks  appear 
relatively  profitable  compared  to German  banks  and  the  largest  American 
banks. Profits  of German  banks appear  to vary less from year to year 
than those of other banks. Japanese  bank profits  appear  relatively  high 
when measured  with return  on equity, while smaller  American  banks  do 
relatively  well with return  on assets. 
These conclusions  must  be treated  with some caution, since account- 
ing standards  differ among  these countries. One important  example of 
the effect of different  accounting  standards  is Germany,  where banks 
are permitted,  in accordance  with their own commercial  judgments, to 
set up reserves against  special risks pertaining  to banking.  German  law 
allows  banks  not to disclose these hidden  reserves, and  the use of hidden 
reserves allows German  banks to smooth out fluctuations  in publicly 
reported  earnings. Such reserving is also likely to reduce the level of 
earnings.  Tax  preferences  encourage  some  of this  reserving;  for  example, 
tax-deductible  additions  to loan-loss  reserves against  loans  to financially Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  269 
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Sources: The  Banker,  various  issues; and the Federal  Reserve. Samples  are same as in figure  7. The return  on 
assets is calculated  as the return  on equity  divided  by the capital-asset  ratio. Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  271 
Table 2.  Average Ratings of Senior Bonds in Four Industrialized Countries,  1990 
Average  Number 
Country  rating  of banks 
United  States  7.0  11 
United  Kingdom  2.6  5 
Germany  1.3  7 
Japan  3.3  17 
Source: International  Bank Credit  Analysis, "Report  Cites Differences  in Ratings  of Major  Credit  Agencies," 
January  28, 1991,  press release. The table shows the average  year-end  long-term  debt ratings  for privately  owned 
banks  that  are evaluated  by all three  credit  rating  agencies.  Bond ratings  are assigned  a numerical  score based  on a 
letter-based  credit  rating  system.  The highest  letter  grade  (for  example,  AAA) is assigned  a value  of 1, the next level 
a 2, and so on. 
troubled  countries  have been managed  by German  banks  as if they were 
hidden  reserves.7 
When  we examine the variability  of profits  across different  banks in 
the same country, German  and  Japanese  bank  profits  show less disper- 
sion than in the other two countries.  This suggests less diversity  among 
the activities of German  and  Japanese  banks  than  among  those of banks 
in the other  two countries. 
Another  gauge of the profitability  of banks in different  countries  lies 
in a comparison  of bond ratings  of banks in different  countries.  Table 2 
shows the average  rating  of senior (that is, not subordinated)  bonds of 
large  banks in the four countries. German  banks have the best ratings, 
in apparent  reflection  of the strong financial  positions of these banks. 
American  banks have by far the worst ratings.  While the state of "too- 
big-to-fail"  doctrines in these countries may affect these ratings, they 
also correspond  closely to the measures  of profitability  we have exam- 
ined. In figures  7 and  8, profits  of German  banks  vary  the least from  year 
to year, while those of the larger  American  banks  vary the most. 
One cost of financial  distress is that corporations  must cut back their 
investment  plans  because  they lack  financing.  This  may  make  investment 
excessively volatile. While  it is beyond  the scope of this paper  to attempt 
a cross-country  comparison  of this issue, table  3 presents  some statistics 
on the variability  of corporate  investment in the four countries. Japan 
appears  to have the least variable  corporate  investment,  judging  by the 
coefficient of variation,  especially when compared  with Germany  and 
the United Kingdom.  American  investment  had been less variable  than 
Japanese investment in the 1970s, but this ordering switched in the 
7.  See Hay and  Bouchet  (1989). 272  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Table 3.  The Variability of Changes in Corporate Investment in Four Industrialized 
Countries, 1970-90 
Coefficient 
Time  of 
Country  perioda  Variance  variation  Mean 
Germanyb  1970-90  0.00146  4.55  0.0084 
1970-79  0.00138  5.56  0.0067 
1980-90  0.00156  3.97  0.0100 
Japan  1970-90  0.00050  1.67  0.0135 
1970-79  0.00063  4.30  0.0058 
1980-90  0.00030  0.85  0.0204 
United Kingdom  1970-90  0.00237  4.48  0.0109 
1970-79  0.00209  5.53  0.0083 
1980-90  0.00267  3.90  0.0132 
United States  1970-90  0.00069  3.23  0.0082 
1970-79  0.00064  2.49  0.0101 
1980-90  0.00075  4.31  0.0064 
Sources:  Data are from various issues of Statistical  Siupplemenit  (Niumber  4) to the Monthly Repor-t  of the Deutsche 
Bindesbank,  Econonmic Statistics  Monthly  (Bank of Japan),  Monthly Digest  of  Statistics  (U.K.  Central Statistical 
Office), and Suirvey of Cuirrent Business (U.S. Department  of Commerce).  The statistics are based on quarterly 
changes in the log of real, seasonally  adjusted,  nonresidential  private  investment.  The level of investment  was 
normalized  to 100  for the first  quarter  of 1970. 
a. Only  the first  three  quarters  of 1990  were used in the analysis. 
b. The German  figures  are based  on equipment  investment  only. 
1980s. The numbers  in the table are only suggestive, since we are not 
using even a simple  structural  model of investment  determination. 
This section has examined  a variety of statistics about the evolution 
of financial  systems in Germany,  Japan, the United Kingdom,  and the 
United States. While  the data  paint  a mixed picture,  we have been able 
to distinguish some differences between U.S.  and foreign financial 
systems. Foreign  banks  tend  to be more  heavily  involved  in the financing 
of corporations  than are U.S. banks, as evidenced by a comparison  of 
flow-of-funds  data. This involvement on the part of foreign banks has 
not changed  substantially  since the 1960s.  Also, foreign  banks,  especially 
German and Japanese, have also expanded more rapidly than U.S. 
banks. Profitability  measures  suggest that German  and Japanese  banks 
have the least risky income streams, a conclusion supported by a 
comparison  of bond  ratings.  The levels of profits  are  difficult  to compare 
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International  Differences in Financial Structure 
In  this  section  we analyze  the structure  of banking  in  the  four  countries. 
We take an inclusive approach and argue that the performance  of a 
banking system depends on much more than the formal regulation 
governing  banks. We find that differences in formal regulation  across 
countries  do not appear  to conform  to differences  in performance.  For 
example,  of the four  banking  systems we address,  the one subject  to the 
most detailed  regulations,  the Japanese system, is also the system that 
by many  measures  has performed  best. 
After  discussing  regulation  in greater  depth,  we examine  the intensity 
of banking  competition  in each country. The level of competition  says 
much  about  the stability  and  efficiency  of national  financial  markets.  We 
also discuss in this section  how banking  practices  differ  across countries, 
and  the key issue here is how banks  form relationships  with customers. 
We find  that  the structure  of these relationships  differs  markedly  across 
countries, and that these  differences stem from the interaction of 
regulatory  factors with more diffuse elements, like the organization  of 
corporations.  One particularly  important  determinant  of relationships 
between banks and customers is the rules and practices governing  the 
resolution  of customers'  financial  distress. We therefore  compare  bank- 
ruptcy  procedures  across countries  in some detail. 
Regulation 
Table 4 compares the regulatory  environments  facing banks in the 
four countries.8  As is well known, regulation  of British and German 
banks  follows a universal  bank  model, under  which banks  are  permitted 
to engage in a wide range  of financial  activities, including  all insurance 
and securities activities. The main difference between the British and 
German  versions of the universal bank is that British banks usually 
conduct their securities business through  subsidiaries, while German 
banks conduct their securities business directly. Neither British nor 
German  banks  face restrictions  on branching. 
8. This table is an abbreviated  and updated  version of a table created  by the staff of 
the Federal Reserve Board for Subcommittee  on Financial Institutions  Supervision, 
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The European  system contrasts  sharply  with the Japanese  and  Amer- 
ican systems. These latter two systems place more restrictions  on the 
activities  of banks  than  do the European  systems. In both Japan  and  the 
United  States, authorities  have gradually  lifted  restrictions  over the past 
decade, but both systems remain much more tightly regulated than 
European banking systems. Japan and the United States also have 
restrictions on the branching  of banks. In the United States these 
restrictions  tend to place geographical  restraints  on branching,  although 
this varies from state to state. In Japan branching  has been tightly 
controlled  by the Ministry  of Finance through  a procedure  of adminis- 
trative  guidance.9 
Banks in these two countries have been largely prohibited  from 
underwriting  and dealing in corporate  securities, although  restrictions 
on underwriting  have been eased recently in the United States. Both 
Japanese  and  U.S. banks  have, however, been permitted  in recent  years 
to engage  in an increasingly  broad  range  of securities  activities  overseas. 
Japanese  banks  are not permitted  to offer insurance  services, while the 
insurance  activities  of U.S. banks  are limited. 
Finally,  both  American  and  Japanese  banks  face long-standing  restric- 
tions on the amount  of equity they may hold in nonfinancial  firms.  The 
Japanese  limitation  on bank  ownership  of nonfinancial  firms  was estab- 
lished  at the beginning  of the postwar  era  by the 1947  Monopoly  and  Fair 
Trade  Law. The U.S. restrictions  date from  the 1930s. 
Japanese  banking  is also highly  segmented.  Regulations  in  Japan  have 
created several different types of banks, each with distinct powers. 
There is little overlap  among  these powers, a fact that would appear  to 
reduce competition  in Japanese  banking.  Table 5 lists different  types of 
Japanese banks and some of the powers granted to them. Such fine 
divisions  in banking  powers do not exist in any of the other  countries  we 
examine. 
One area  of substantial  recent change  in Japan  and  the United States 
has been the progressive removal of restrictions  on the interest rates 
that banks may pay on deposits. This process began as late as 1984  in 
Japan,'0  and that country still has comparatively  more restrictions  on 
9. See Federation  of Bankers  Associations  of Japan  (1989). 
10. For details on deposit rate deregulation  in Japan, see Federation  of Bankers 
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Table 5.  Types of Japanese Banks 
Type  of bank  Regulatory  restrictions 
Domestically  owned 
Ordinary  banks  -prohibited from engaging  in trust-related  businesses (for 
example, pension  fund management  and investment  trust 
management) 
-prohibited from issuing long-term  bank debt, except 
convertible  bonds (since 1987)  and regulated  amounts  of 
subordinated  debt for the purpose  of improving  capital 
adequacy  levels (since June 1990) 
-prohibited from accepting  deposits with maturities  over 
three years 
-two  city banks  differ  in their range  of activities  from other 
ordinary  banks:  one is authorized  to issue long-term  debt 
but is restricted  by its number  of branches,  the other is 
authorized  to engage in trust-related  activities despite the 
prohibition  for other ordinary  banks. 
Long-term  credit  -authorized to issue long-term  bank debt (with up to a five- 
banks  year maturity) 
-may  only accept deposits from its borrowers  and 
governments 
-may  open only a very limited  number  of branches 
Trust  banks  -authorized to engage in trust-related  businesses (for 
example, pension fund management  and investment  trust 
management) 
-authorized  to raise funds for long-term  financing  through 
loan trusts and money trusts (that is, term deposits 
consolidated  for the purpose  of extending  long-term  credits) 
Financial  insti-  -clients  are restricted  by number  of employees and 
tutions  for  capitalization  levels (for example, shinkin  banks' business 
small busi-  clients are limited  in size to 300 employees and Y400 million 
nesses  in capital) 
-clients  are limited  mainly  to members  of the cooperatives  or 
credit unions 
Securities  firms  -prohibited from engaging  in banking  activities 
Foreign-owned 
Banks  -authorized  to engage in securities  activities through  partially 
owned securities  affiliates  (unlike  domestic banks, which are 
prohibited  from securities  activities) 
-authorized  to engage in trust-related  activities through  the 
establishment  of trust bank affiliates 
Securities  firms  -authorized to engage in banking  activities through 
subsidiaries  (since 1990) 
Sources: Federation  of Bankers  Associations  of Japan  (1989)  and Robins  (1987). 280  Brookings Paper-s  on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
deposit interest rates than other countries. There are no significant 
formal restrictions  in Germany  or the United Kingdom, and the only 
remaining  restriction  in the United States is a restriction  on interest  paid 
for demand-deposit  accounts. 
All four  countries  have a formal  deposit  insurance  system. The British 
system is the newest, dating  from 1982.11  As is shown in table 4, the 
British system also caps individual  depositor coverage at the lowest 
level, up to only $35,000.  12  Moreover,  the British  system, unlike  others, 
does not pay back  the full value  of the deposit;  instead  the customer  only 
receives 75 percent  of the face value of the deposit. The extent to which 
insurance  systems are used varies widely. The extreme case is Japan, 
which has not had a bank  failure  over the entire  postwar  period;  rather 
than allow failure, weak banks have simply been merged into strong 
ones.'3 This policy has the potential to increase the profitability  of 
Japanese banks; by acting to  prevent insured banks from running 
themselves into insolvency, Japanese  authorities  may reduce  the incen- 
tive of bank managers  to exploit the put-option  value of deposit insur- 
ance.  14 
Despite these important  differences  in banking  regulation,  we hesitate 
to place too much  weight  on a comparison  of deposit insurance  systems. 
Formal deposit insurance systems are not the only part of the bank 
safety  net. For  large  banks  in  all  countries,  authorities  are  widely  believed 
to adhere  to a "too-big-to-fail"  doctrine  (though  this  is rarely  confirmed), 
which makes it likely that all liabilities  of a large  bank  will be protected 
in the event of failure. We noted earlier that the cross-country bond 
ratings  in table 2 may be affected by specific market  beliefs concerning 
not only the likelihood  of bank  failure  but also the scope of protection 
provided  to depositors  and other creditors  of large  banks. 
In summary,  we have examined  what are, from  the standpoint  of this 
paper, the most important aspects of bank regulation. In terms of 
restrictions  on banks,  the Japanese  system is the most heavily  regulated, 
11. The British  deposit protection  plan was established  under  the provisions  of the 
Banking  Act of 1979.  See General  Accounting  Office  (1991). 
12. The coverage of the German  system extends to 30 percent  of bank's capital  per 
depositor.  This  level essentially  provides  unlimited  insurance,  especially  for depositors  in 
large  banks. 
13. See Suzuki  (1987). 
14. See Merton  (1977). Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  281 
and the British  and German  systems the least regulated.  The American 
system appears  to lie between the two extremes. Yet, if we believe our 
performance  measures, this regulation  does not appear  to have handi- 
capped Japanese  banks. We discuss these links between structure  and 
performance  more  thoroughly  in a later section. 
Competition 
Banks clearly are affected by other, nonregulatory  aspects of the 
banking  system. One important  such variable  is the intensity  of compe- 
tition in a market. Increased competition is  likely to  increase the 
efficiency of banking,  by reducing  the ability  of bankers  to exploit their 
market  power. A possible downside of competition,  however, is that a 
reduction  in bank profits may render  banking  markets  less stable and 
may possibly harm  macroeconomic  stability. 
As with many  banking  statistics, direct comparison  of banking  com- 
petition  across  countries  is difficult.  The simplest  measure  of competition 
is the degree of concentration  within a market. This measure differs 
greatly  across countries.  Figure  9 compares  the concentration  of banking 
markets  across the four countries. It shows the value of total banking 
assets in the four  countries  and  the value  of assets held  by the five  biggest 
and the five next-biggest banks. All  three foreign markets appear 
substantially  more  concentrated  than  in the United States. In both  Japan 
and Germany,  the ten largest  banks  have over half the total assets of all 
banks; in the United Kingdom they have 41 percent. The ten largest 
banks  in the United States own less than  30 percent  of total assets. 
Another  piece of evidence corroborates  the relatively  low degree of 
concentration  in the United States compared  with other countries. As 
shown in table 6, there are more banks in the United States than in all 
three of the other countries combined. Over 12,000  commercial  banks 
held charters  in the United States as of 1990. The largest comparable 
number  was for Germany,  which had  273. 
The low degree of concentration  in the U.S.  banking  market may 
mean that the U.S.  market is more competitive and therefore more 
efficient  than in other countries. On closer examination,  however, this 
is far  from  obvious. The federal  government,  as well as individual  state 
governments,  has historically  placed  many  restrictions  on the geograph- 
ical expansion  of banks. Since a local presence is needed  for many  types 282  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Figure 9.  Concentration  of Bank Assets in Four Industrialized  Countries, 
Fiscal Year 1989 
Trillions  of dollars 
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Sources:  The Batnker, various  issues;  Federal  Reserve  Blulletin, July  1990. p.  A18;  Bank  of  England  Quarterls 
Biulletin, February  1991. table 3.1; Monthhv Report of the Deutsche  Buindesbank, December  1990, table  1.2(a); and 
Economic  Statistics  Monthly,  February  1991. In Japan the fiscal year  1989 ended  March 31,  1989. and in the United 
States,  the United  Kingdom, and Germany the fiscal year ended December  31,  1989. Assets  are converted  to dollars 
at fiscal-year-end  exchange  rates. 
of banking  services, the large  number  of banks  in the United  States does 
not necessarily imply a high degree of competition in local banking 
markets.  As discussed by Montgomery  in a recent study, the effect on 
competition  of having  integrated  nationwide  banks  is ambiguous  because 
oligopolistic  banks operating  in many local markets  may find  it easy to 
coordinate  their  actions in individual  local markets.  5 
The greater  degree of fragmentation  in the United States increases 
the exposure  of banks  to idiosyncratic  risk, especially to shocks specific 
to one geographic region. Banks will be exposed to region-specific 
shocks when they have concentrated  their lending  (and their low-cost 
funding)  in the affected  area. This is one reason  that  banks  in the United 
States are more prone to failure. When banks have operations spread 
across many regions, their exposure to idiosyncratic  shocks is reduced 
and  failure  becomes less likely. 
The economic benefits of a reduced failure rate are, however, not 
entirely obvious. Despite the fact that regionally  diversified  banks are 
15.  Montgomery (1991). Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  283 
Table 6.  Number of Commercial Banks in Four Industrialized Countries,  1990 
Number 
Country  of banks 
United  Statesa  12,500 
United  Kingdomb  209 
Japanc  154 
Germanyd  273 
Sources:  U.S.  Department of the Treasury (1991); Bank of Englatid  Quiarterly  Builletin (February  1991); Monthly 
Repott  of  thie Deuitsche  Buindesbatnk  (December  1990, p.  32);  and Economic  Statistics  Monthly  (Bank  of  Japan, 
February  1991). 
a.  Banks include all federally insured national- and state-chartered  banks. 
b.  Figures  are for  all banks  that  constitute  the  Bank  of  England's  "monetary  sector":  retail banks,  merchant 
banks, and  "other British banks." 
c.  Banks include  all member banks of the Federation  of Bankers  Associations  of Japan: city  banks, trust banks, 
long-term credit banks,  regional banks,  and second  association  regional banks. 
d.  Banks include all banks that constitute  the Bundesbank's  commercial bank category: big banks, regional banks, 
other commercial  banks,  and private banks. 
less likely to fail, their loans individually  may be equally risky. A bad 
loan in a less diversified  bank is more likely to lead to bank closure, 
while a bad  loan in a geographically  diversified  bank  is more  likely to be 
offset by funds  from a good loan within  the same firm.  Only if the costs 
of bank failure are intrinsically  high is the latter arrangement  more 
efficient. 
The presence of foreign  banks  may also affect competition  by making 
it difficult  for domestic banks to coordinate  by adhering  to "traditional 
banking  practices," which may include  informal  restraints  on competi- 
tion. There is a sharp contrast in the activities of foreign banks in 
Germany  and Japan  on the one hand and the United Kingdom  and the 
United  States on the other. As shown  in figure  10,  the foreign  bank  share 
of total outstanding  commercial  loans is much lower for Germany  and 
Japan,  never more than  4 percent over the three years in our sample,16 
while the foreign shares of commercial  loans for the United Kingdom 
and  the United States reach 32 and 21 percent  respectively in 1990.  The 
high numbers  for the United Kingdom may partly result from Euro- 
market  business in London, which would not increase competition in 
other U.K. banking  markets.  However, the measure  we have reported 
for commercial  loans excludes interbank  lending, which would have 
16. The Japanese number  may be biased downward  compared  to the other three 
countries  because  the Japanese  figures  express  foreign  presence  as a share  of all domestic 
loans, not  just commercial  loans. 284  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1991 
Figure 10. Percent of Outstanding  Commercial  Loans Made by Foreign Banks 
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Sources:  The Banker, vanous  issues; Federal Reserve Bulletin, various  issues; Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
various  issues,  tables  3.1-7;  Monthly  Report of the Deutsche  Bundesbank,  various  issues;  and Economic  Statistics 
Monthly,  various  issues.  All  data are from the  month of  December,  except  the  1980 German figure,  which  is  for 
September.  The definition of outstanding commercial  loans differs slightly across  the countries:  in the United  States 
it includes  commercial  and industrial loans  at all  institutions;  in the  United  Kingdom  it is  total  advances  to  the 
private sector;  in Japan, total loans and discounts;  and in Germany,  loans and advances  to nonbanks. 
a.  The German data for  1990 include subsidiaries of U.S.  banks,  in both total loans and foreign loans. 
made the measured  foreign  penetration  in the United Kingdom  consid- 
erably  higher. 
Customer Relationships 
Long-term  relationships  are an essential characteristic  of the inter- 
action  between a bank  and its customers.  Theory  suggests  that  relation- 
ships exist to overcome inefficiencies that would arise if interactions 
were restricted  to the short term.  17  As such, the key characteristic  of a 
relationship  is the repeated  interaction  between intermediary  and cus- 
tomer. Previous discussion of financing  relationships  has focused on a 
situation  in which  the intermediary  acquires  some information  about  the 
customer.  The existence of this information  then creates a surplus  in the 
transactions  between these two parties, a surplus that they somehow 
divide. 
17. See Sharpe  (1990). Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  285 
Whether Pareto-improving,  long-term contracts can be written in 
these circumstances  depends  on contracting  technology. Contracts  can 
be either implicit  or explicit. Explicit contracts have the advantage  of 
being  relatively  cheap  to enforce;  once written,  parties  are  likely to have 
recourse  to the legal system to enforce the contract, so that  reneging  on 
explicit contracts is relatively unlikely. On the other hand, explicit 
contracts may be very costly to write. In particular,  it may be very 
expensive to specify explicitly  all important  events on which the parties 
would find it useful to contract. Implicit contracts may be a way of 
getting  around  the costs of writing  contracts,  especially  when  unforeseen 
events occur. 
The form  of contracting  available  to a bank  thus affects the degree  to 
which it can form relationships.  Forms of contracting  vary markedly 
across countries.  They appear  to result  not only from  legal restrictions, 
but also from an accretion  of traditional  practices, which may get built 
into the expectations of  supervisors and customers. In Japan and 
Germany  banks  are able to form  close ties with  nonfinancial  firms,  while 
in the United States and the United Kingdom  a number  of restrictions 
on ties between banks and other firms reduce the possible scope for 
relationships.  In both Germany  and Japan  banks  hold important  equity 
interests  in nonfinancial  firms.  In 1988  banks  held 12  percent  of outstand- 
ing  stock  in  German  firms  and  21  percent  of outstanding  stock  in  Japanese 
firms.18 In Germany banks also hold seats on supervisory boards of 
firms.  In Japan  banks  routinely  dispatch  their  own personnel  to troubled 
client  firms.  By contrast, such direct  involvements  have been rare  in the 
United States and  in the United Kingdom.  '9 
Corporate  finance  in Germany  has traditionally  been bank-directed. 
Banks are engaged not only in corporate lending, but also in equity 
investments, both for their own accounts and, more importantly,  for 
custody accounts  for which they have been given not only discretionary 
investment  authority  but also the exercise of proxy voting  rights  (the so- 
called  Depotstimmecht,  or depository  vote). In such a structure,  banks 
have become accustomed  to being the arbiters  of corporate  control. In 
18. See Edwards  and  Fischer  (1991)  and  Tokyo Stock Exchange  (1990). 
19. Such involvement  is rare  even for nonbank  financial  intermediaries  that can and 
do have sizable equity holdings,  such as insurance  companies  and securities  firms.  This 
suggests  that  tradition  plays  a role in determining  the form  of relationships.  Legal  factors, 
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fact, German  commentary  has stressed  the superiority  of German  proxy 
voting  because  it affords  appreciable  control  over  a firm's  management.20 
In Japan  relationships  between banks  and nonfinancial  firms  are less 
direct than in Germany.  Many Japanese firms are organized  into net- 
works of firms  known as keiretsu. Banks are important  participants  in 
keiretsu,  but they do not control  the activities of the group. In contrast 
to the German  bank involvement with industry through supervisory 
boards, senior  officers  of Japanese  banks  are not members  of corporate 
boards.  The  Japanese  practice  of cross-shareholding  between  banks  and 
nonfinancial  firms  appears  to make,  the keiretsu  model one of collective 
decisionmaking. 
The tendency of banks  in the United States and the United Kingdom 
not to hold equity positions in client nonfinancial  firms restricts the 
dimensions  of the possible relationships  these banks  may  form.  The lack 
of equity positions may reduce banks' returns  from transacting  with a 
borrower.  Also, stockholders  can free-ride  on the acquisition  of infor- 
mation  by the bank:  the fact that a firm  has borrowed  from a bank may 
serve as a positive signal  of the quality  of the firm.  If there  is a long-term 
relationship  between the firm  and the bank, the bank  can recover from 
the firm  the return  from  cheaper  equity  financing.  However, if this long- 
term  relationship  breaks  down, the  bank  may  be unable  to extract  enough 
return  from a short-term  contract  to make it worthwhile  to acquire  the 
information. 
It is common  wisdom  among  observers  of U.S. banking  that  relation- 
ship  banking  is becoming  less common  and is being  replaced  by market- 
based transactions  using explicit, standardized  contracts. Advances in 
technology have abetted this process by reducing  the cost to market 
participants  of computing  the values of complex financial  instruments. 
It is difficult,  however, to get direct statistical  evidence on the extent of 
the move away from relationship  banking.  It is possible that the shift in 
the United States has been exaggerated  by anecdotal  evidence. 
A good example  is the commercial  paper  market.  While  many  Amer- 
ican corporations  have turned to this market  for their short-term  and 
medium-term  financing  needs, their  commercial  paper  is almost always 
backed up by a credit line from the bank. These credit lines appear  to 
resemble relationship  banking,  in that although  banks usually have the 
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legal right  to withdraw  the lines under  some circumstances,  they rarely 
do so when a firm's financial  situation  deteriorates.  Part of the reason 
for the steadfastness of banks appears to be that their reputation  as 
reliable  issuers of credit  lines would suffer  if they withdrew  the lines.21 
If there indeed has been a shift from relationship to transaction 
banking  in the United States, it is likely to have reduced  the economic 
costs of bank  failures.  Consider  that  one possible consequence  of a bank 
failure  is that the bank's  private  knowledge  of customers, built  up over 
its history, disappears  or is present  in a less well capitalized  form  and so 
has a harder  time attracting  outside funds.22  In this case, the bank's 
knowledge represented  a relationship-specific  investment between in- 
termediary  and customer, for which a relationship  contract provides 
adequate  return.  If the financial  system has been changing  so that  these 
relationship-specific  investments are no longer as common, then the 
failure  of the bank  will not destroy as much  capital.  Moreover,  it should 
be easier to set up new intermediaries,  since they do not require  lengthy 
investments  in relationships. 
Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein  argue that the 
close relationships  of banks and firms  within  Japanese  keiretsu  reduce 
the costs of financial  distress.23  They find  that  firms  that  are  not members 
of keiretsu  are more  likely to cut back  investment  when they experience 
low cash flow than  are firms  that are members.  This clearly implies  that 
the keiretsu  structure  enhances the stability  of the Japanese  economy. 
It is  questionable, however, whether this implies that relationship 
banking,  either in the Japanese keiretsu or in some other model, can 
more efficiently  deal with troubled  firms.  Michelle White  examines the 
reorganization  and liquidation of bank-shareholder  coalitions under 
different  bankruptcy  rules.24  She argues that coalitions often have the 
incentive  to make  inefficient  decisions at the expense of other  stakehold- 
ers. Thus, if we extend her argument  to the Japanese  context, coalitions 
may continue  investing  in a firm  even though  it may be socially optimal 
to use those resources  elsewhere. 
21. See Hirtle  (1990)  for a discussion  of the U.S. market  for bank  commitments. 
22. See Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1987)  for a related  discussion  of the effects of a change 
in bank  capital. 
23. Hoshi, Kashyap,  and  Scharfstein  (1991). 
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Bankruptcy Procedures 
The foregoing  discussion suggests that the form of relationships  in a 
banking  system can influence  the resolution  of the financial  distress of a 
nonfinancial  firm.  How this  distress  is resolved  affects  both  the  efficiency 
and the stability  of the economic system. The rules governing  financial 
distress also influence  the extent of the relationships.  Thus, these rules, 
particularly  bankruptcy  laws and procedures, affect the returns of a 
bank  when its customer  has trouble. 
National bankruptcy  rules cover both formal bankruptcy  (reorgani- 
zation  and  liquidation)  and  informal  workout  arrangements.  Importantly, 
informal  arrangements  are protected  by a predisposition  on the part of 
bankruptcy  courts  to refuse  to review  challenges  to negotiated  outcomes 
when  those outcomes  have  been  accepted  by a critical  core  of a financially 
troubled  firm's  creditors.  Such a predisposition  obviously increases  the 
likelihood  of success for coalition  building  by those individual  creditors 
who are particularly  well informed about the interests of potential 
members  of a coalition. 
Bankruptcy rules in the United Kingdom and the United States 
contrast sharply  with those in Germany  and Japan.  The common legal 
tradition  shared  by the former  two countries may account for some of 
this difference. Bankruptcy  laws in these two countries  penalize banks 
that  form  close relationships  with  a customer.  If the  customer  encounters 
financial problems, provisions in American and British law impose 
greater losses on the bank than on other creditors. In Germany  and 
Japan,  courts  shield  banks  from  these losses and,  in  Japan,  favor  informal 
workouts  organized  by a bank,  even at the expense of other creditors. 
In countries such as Germany  and Japan, such informal  bankruptcy 
arrangements  predominate  over formal  arrangements  mandated  by the 
legal system. Banks often take responsibility  for organizing  creditor 
coalitions for financially  troubled firms. A bank's behavior in such a 
workout  may  be disciplined  by its interest  in  establishing  and  maintaining 
a reputation  as a structurer  and arranger  of successful firms'  finances. 
The United States and the United Kingdom have, over extended 
periods, chosen to restrict  or discourage  the assumption  by banks and 
other large institutional  investors of "insider" roles with respect to 
financially  distressed firms. For example, in the United Kingdom, the 
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firm liable, as  a  "shadow director," for any of its directions that 
contradicted  the objective of minimizing  the potential loss of all the 
company's  creditors.25 It has become generally  accepted that a compa- 
ny's bankers  can be considered  shadow directors  for this purpose, and 
this risk has supposedly  had a chilling  effect on the willingness  of banks 
to participate  in informal  corporate  rescues.26 
The concept of equitable  subordination  in U.S. law also deters  banks 
from active control  of a financially  troubled  corporate  borrower.27  This 
deterrence  derives  from  the responsibilities  that  equitable  subordination 
imposes on a bank  with respect to other creditors. If the bank  is found 
to exercise effective control  over a debtor  firm,  the court's penalty  may 
be a significant  reduction in the priority status of a bank's claims. 
American legal commentators  observe that the concept of equitable 
subordination  has been referred  to with increasing  frequency, particu- 
larly  in chapter 11  reorganization  cases.28 
American law also inhibits informal workouts. Binding votes by 
bondholders  to change any core term (principal  amount, interest rate, 
or maturity  date) of a bond issue are prohibited  by law. The principal 
architect  of this prohibition  was the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion under  Chairman  William  0.  Douglas, who reportedly  was not only 
aware  that  requiring  near  unanimity  for a change  of any core term  would 
help induce bankruptcy,  but in fact welcomed the prospect. He was 
motivated  by concerns that negotiated  solutions  would benefit  insiders. 
The bankruptcy  courts' scrutiny  of financial  restructurings  is a way of 
guarding  against  this.29 
By contrast, Japanese legal structures  create barriers  to the use of 
formal reorganization  procedures and encourage the use of informal 
mechanisms.30  According  to Brooke Schumm, a court may bar a filing 
under formal reorganization procedures  ".  . .based only on a brief pre- 
petition investigation." A court's dismissal of permission  for a firm's 
formal  reorganization  can be costly to the directors  and managers  of a 
25.  See International Financial Law Review (1990). 
26. This  point  has been made  to us in conversations  with  British  bankers. 
27. See DeNatale  and  Abram  (1985). 
28. See Phillips  (1981).  This tendency  has been affirmed  to us in recent  conversations 
with  attorneys. 
29. See Roe (1987). 
30. The following  three paragraphs  draw  on work  by Brooke  Schumm.  See Schumm 
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publicly  held  corporation  since  they  ".  .  .  may  become  individually 
liable for debts of the corporation without having signed personal 
guarantees.  " 
The convening  of formal  bankruptcy  proceedings  in Japan  is a much 
less common event than in the United States.3' Such proceedings  are 
seemingly  regarded  as providing  public  opportunities  for the humiliation 
of those guilty  of "bankruptcy  crimes.  " The  penalties  that  may  be levied 
on individuals  in these circumstances  include  revocation  of professional 
licenses, prohibition  against serving as a director of a publicly held 
company,  and  the assignment  of personal  responsibility  for certain  debts 
of the bankrupt  firm. 
The punitive  character  of formal  Japanese  bankruptcy  rules  contrasts 
with the informal nature of the rules governing workout situations. 
Reportedly,  the typical practice  is the convening  of a conference  of the 
financially  troubled  firms' creditors. The conference is successful if a 
"majority"  of creditors  accepts a solution. It is Japanese  practice that 
all creditors who attend such a  conference commit themselves to 
accepting  the majority's  solution;  that  is, disaffected  creditors  agree  not 
to mount legal challenges to informally  negotiated  workout solutions. 
Frequently,  a bank  assumes the lead role in convening  a conference  and 
in framing  a workable  solution, after  consultation  with other  creditors. 
In Germany bankers describe it as  natural for them to  assume 
responsibility  for framing  refinancing  solutions  for a financially  troubled 
customer.32  They state a clear presumption  that German courts will 
normally  not scrutinize  an informal  workout  agreement,  unless the court 
is presented  with possible evidence of a fraudulent  act on the part  of the 
house bank.33  In contrast  with American  practice, German  bankers  do 
not speak  of legal  deterrence  to a bank's  control  of a client  firm,  although 
German  law does provide  penalties  for situations  in which  intent  to harm 
the interests of other creditors  of the firm  can be established. German 
bankruptcy  rules  are therefore  only one element  in an overall  regulatory 
31. For  example,  using  the data  on which  figure  3 is based, there  were  7,234  corporate 
bankruptcies  in Japan  in 1989,  while  there  were 63,117  in the United  States. 
32. Material  for  this discussion  is based  on conversations  with  German  bankers  on the 
general  subject  of relationship  banking  in Germany. 
33. A house bank  of a particular  firm  in Germany  is the bank  that is the main  banker 
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system that assigns clear monitoring responsibilities to banks with 
respect to the financing  activities of their  customers. 
Effect of Financial Structure on Performance 
In an earlier  section we considered  several different  measures  of the 
performance  of national  banking  systems. Several  conclusions  emerged. 
Over  the past two decades of substantial  financial  innovation,  the health 
of U.S. banks appears to have deteriorated.  During  the same period, 
German  and  Japanese  banks  have expanded  more  rapidly  than  American 
and British banks. Comparative  bond ratings suggest that large U.S. 
banks  are considered  poorer  investments  than their counterparts  over- 
seas. Data  on bank  profits  in different  countries  are difficult  to interpret, 
though  it appears  that  German  and  Japanese  banks  have the most stable 
profits.  It also appears  that  corporate  investment  is less volatile  in Japan 
than in other countries. We have also examined the differences in 
financial  structure  across  these  four  countries.  We  now  proceed  therefore 
to consider the extent to which structural  differences can explain the 
financial  performance  of these four countries. 
As mentioned  earlier,  one important  regulatory  difference  among  the 
countries  is that British  and German  banks  are permitted  to organize  as 
universal  banks, while American  and Japanese  banks face substantial 
restrictions  on entering  insurance  and  securities  businesses. The univer- 
sal bank  model should  improve  bank  performance  if there  are significant 
economies of scope when banking,  insurance,  and securities activities 
are linked. The logic of these economies of scope seems fairly strong. 
Underwriting  corporate  securities  requires  the same information-acqui- 
sition  activities  as making  bank  loans. This  may  explain  why, as securities 
markets  in the United States have become increasingly  sophisticated, 
large  corporations  have  relied  less on banks  for informationally  intensive 
financing  than  in the past. Banks  are no longer  able to capture  enough  of 
the financing  of these companies  to make acquiring  information  on the 
companies  worthwhile.  Synergies  between banking  and insurance  may 
also arise  from  common  informational  needs. Economies  of scope might 
be obtained from the retailing of  securities and insurance in bank 
branches.  Nevertheless, while these arguments  for economies of scope 
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Our own performance  data do not show a clear distinction between 
European banks and others, except for the evidence that corporate 
investment is more volatile in Europe than in Japan and the United 
States. But that  difference  does not seem to be related  to the economies 
of scope we have discussed. 
It is arguable  that the lack of universal  banking  has hurt American 
banks more than Japanese banks. The Japanese keiretsu offers the 
Japanese banks a way to  increase their returns from investing in 
information  beyond the returns that might be obtained on the open 
market. American banks have no such alternative  and therefore lose 
business when financial  markets  become more securitized.  A universal 
banking  structure  that allows banks  to participate  fully in securitization 
could increase  the return  for banks  on acquiring  information. 
We also noted  that  the domestic  expansion  of American  and  Japanese 
banks is  limited by regulation. Such restrictions seem particularly 
important  in the United States, since they keep banks  from  diversifying 
geographically.  It is likely that  this lack of diversification  contributes  to 
the large number of bank failures in the United States. It may also 
increase  the riskiness  of large,  money-center  banks  in the United States, 
which have much worse bond ratings  than their counterparts  in other 
countries. To the extent that bank failures are costly,  the lack of 
diversification  of U.S. banks will impair  the performance  of the U.S. 
financial  system. 
One salient characteristic  of the Japanese system, which table 5 
illustrates,  is the division of the banking  system into institutional  types, 
each with different  restrictions  on activities, assets, and liabilities.  This 
practice  is likely to have two effects. First, it may reduce  the efficiency 
of banks, by preventing them from engaging in activities that offer 
economies  of scale and  scope. Second, it may  reduce  competition  among 
banks, by sharply demarcating  the lines of business each bank may 
enter. This is especially true when coupled with the dearth of new 
banking charters in Japan.34  This lack of competition may enhance 
stability, but is also likely to reduce the efficiency of loan and deposit 
pricing  in Japan. 
Our  conclusions  about  the amount  of competition  among  banks  in the 
different systems have been mixed. While foreign countries have far 
34. The Bank  of Japan  (1990)  reports  that  there  were 86 ordinary  banks  in 1955  and  87 
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fewer banks than the United States, the geographical  segmentation  of 
the U.S. market  tends to reduce  the competition  among  the 12,000  banks 
chartered  in that market.  Penetration  by foreign  banks is much greater 
in the United Kingdom  than in Germany  and Japan, a fact that would 
tend to increase competition in the United Kingdom  compared  to the 
other two countries. Competition,  in turn, should tend to reduce bank 
profits, yet our profit measures (albeit rather  unreliable)  indicate that 
British banks are more profitable than German banks. Given this 
difficulty  in comparing  profits  across countries,  we believe that  compar- 
isons of the variability  of profits are more meaningful.  By this metric, 
German  and  Japanese  banks  do the best. Thus, relatively  low degrees  of 
competition  may well contribute  to higher  profits. 
As discussed  earlier,  relationships  between  banks  and  their  customers 
are  an important  structural  element  in the banking  systems of Japan  and 
Germany.  For the Japanese  keiretsu,  cross-shareholdings  appear  to be 
an important  part  of the glue holding  these groups  together.  In Germany 
banks derive part of their power over corporations  from their control 
over proxy voting rather than through their equity stakes. In fact, 
German  banks frequently  sell their equity stakes in nonfinancial  com- 
panies, rather  than  retain  stable shares  in client firms.35 
There  are  theoretical  reasons  for believing  that  allowing  banks  to hold 
equity shares may improve the incentives for banks to make good 
financing  decisions. Equity claims make the bank more of a residual 
claimant,  which in a principal-agent  framework  increases the link be- 
tween the returns  to the client's business and the returns  to the bank. If 
the bank has a close enough relationship  with its customer to have 
substantial  private information  on the customer's business and also to 
have some control over the decisions that the customer makes, then 
equity holdings will give the bank a better incentive to make value- 
increasing decisions. 
The downside  of allowing  banks  to hold equity is that  they bear  more 
risk. This increases the risk of bank  failure, especially if banks are not 
35. Immenga  (1979)  focuses on situations  in which  German  banks  would  be expected 
to take  a temporary  equity  participation  in a firm.  Such  situations  are  characterized  by the 
need for ". . . a strong  financial  institution  to step in and help develop a constructive 
solution  to a business  problem"  (p. 33). One such situation  listed by Immenga  involves 
the passage  of property  by inheritance,  a situation  that might  involve the liquidation  of 
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well diversified.  In the presence of deposit  insurance,  bankers  may have 
an incentive to take on too much equity risk and therefore  increase the 
incidence  of bank  failures. 
This discussion  of banking  relationships  suggests  that  allowing  banks 
to hold equity  may increase  the efficiency  of corporate  decisionmaking, 
but may also increase  the incidence  of bank  failures.  These conclusions 
do not line  up well with  our  performance  data.  There  have  been no recent 
failures  in the Japanese  system, where  bank  holdings  of corporate  equity 
are high, but there have been many failures in the U.S.  system. This 
pattern  seems more  the result  of the limited  diversification  of U.S. banks 
and the Japanese  policy of merging  sick banks  into healthy  banks, than 
of the equity position a bank takes. Although  we did not examine any 
evidence on the comparative  efficiency of corporate  decisionmaking, 
nor are we aware  of any such studies, this is clearly an area warranting 
further  research. The evidence we have discussed suggests that equity 
holdings  alone do not cause bank  failures, nor does the absence of such 
holdings  prevent  failures. 
In our comparison of bankruptcy  procedures, we concluded that 
the willingness of courts to sanction informal,  bank-sponsored  work- 
outs in Germany  and Japan  may help eliminate  the free-rider  problems 
that can arise in the absence of such workouts. This practice likely 
lowers  the costs of financial  distress  in Germany  and  Japan.  The practice 
also explains why the number  of corporate  bankruptcies  has increased 
greatly  in the United Kingdom  and the United States, as the economic 
environment  has become more volatile, while the number has risen 
much less in Germany  and Japan. Elements of American  and British 
bankruptcy  law  also penalize  a bank  for  exerting  control  over  a borrower. 
This makes banks in these countries  more reluctant  to enter into close 
customer relationships, a fact that may decrease the efficiency of 
corporate  decisionmaking. 
In summary,  this section has discussed the effects of cross-country 
differences  in  the structure  of banking  systems on economic  and  financial 
performance.  We have attempted  to relate these structural  differences 
to the observable differences in performance.  The inadequacy  of our 
performance  data,  however, limits  this  exercise. Many  of the differences 
in performance  that  should  theoretically  exist are  unobservable.  In part, 
this is due to the fact that the structures  of the four systems differ in 
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given difference  in performance.  But the limitations  of this exercise are 
also due to the fact that it is  intrinsically difficult to  measure the 
performance  of a banking system. Banks deal with assets for which 
market  prices do not exist; thus we cannot determine  the efficiency of 
banking  activities by comparing  the decisions of bankers to those of 
markets. The stability of a financial system is even more difficult  to 
measure empirically. Authorities are likely to act to prevent major 
systemic problems, so that structural  features that make a system less 
stable  may never actually  cause observable  instability. 
Conclusions  for U.S. Policy Reform 
In this paper  we have compared  the performance  of the U.S. banking 
system with those of several other large industrial  countries. We have 
also examined structural  differences between the U.S.  and foreign 
systems and attempted to assess the effects of these differences on 
performance.  We believe this exercise has two major  benefits. First, 
foreign  experiences  may help us foretell  the consequences of changes  in 
the U.S. financial  structure.  Second, an understanding  of how foreign 
banks  differ  from U.S. banks may help us understand  what determines 
the competitiveness of U.S. banks in international  markets. Ensuring 
competitiveness  is necessary in order  to resist pressures  to protect  U.S. 
financial  markets. In this final section, then, we discuss three possible 
changes  in U.S. policy that  our findings  point to as worth  considering. 
The first possible change is  to  allow U.S.  banks to  take more 
substantial  equity  positions  in nonfinancial  firms.  We noted some advan- 
tages of equity holdings in the previous section. Equity holdings can 
increase the return to banks from customer relations. Equity, as a 
residual claim, may also make bankers more concerned that their 
corporate  customers  make  value-maximizing  decisions. A disadvantage 
of equity holdings is that they would increase the riskiness of bank 
assets. In the fragmented  U.S. banking  system, with its large  number  of 
banks,  this would  increase  the burden  on bank  supervisors  and  possibly 
increase the incidence of  bank failures. This potentiality could be 
countered, however, by increasing banks' capital requirements. As 
stressed earlier, the advantages and disadvantages to banks' taking 
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empirical  evidence on this issue. It would seem wise to acquire such 
evidence before proceeding  with a policy that is likely to require  either 
increased  bank  supervision  or increased  bank  capital. 
A  second possible change in the United States would alter two 
apparent  inefficiencies  of the U.S. bankruptcy  system. One of these is 
the limit  on bank-customer  relationships,  stemming  from  the doctrine  of 
equitable  subordination.  The other is the legal limitations  on informally 
negotiated  workouts  among  a subset of creditors. 
A current  debate in the United Kingdom  concerns the consequences 
of relying  on informal  workouts structured  within a framework  known 
as the London  Approach.  In  this  framework,  the lead  bank  of a financially 
distressed firm assumes responsibility  for managing  relationships  be- 
tween  a creditor  group  and  the distressed  company.  The  Bank  of England 
has come out in support  of this approach,  emphasizing  the responsibility 
of the lead  bank  in  contributing  to the orderly  management  of a distressed 
firm's  financial  situation.36  Although  such an arrangement  in the United 
States might  encourage  banks  to develop closer relationships  with their 
customers  and might  also forestall  some of the inefficiencies  associated 
with the formal  bankruptcy  process, it is doubtful  whether  a system that 
relies on a small core of large banks would be workable in the more 
decentralized  U.S. banking  system. 
A third  possible area  for change  in the United States is the elimination 
of remaining  barriers  on geographical  expansion of banks. The high 
number  of failures  in the United States might  be lowered if banks could 
take advantage of greater geographical diversification. This idea is 
appealing,  though  the case is not airtight.  In a recent study, Montgomery 
discusses some drawbacks  to a geographical  consolidation  of banks.37 
Authorities must be aware that in banking markets where effective 
competition across geographical  lines exists,  a risk also exists: the 
consolidation  of banks  may reduce  the number  of competing  banks, and 
possibly reduce the efficiency of the market.  The trade-off  here is that 
greater  diversification  may also reduce  the incidence  of bank  failures. 
We believe all three of the above reforms  warrant  consideration.  Of 
the three, the case for removing  barriers  on the geographical  expansion 
of U.S. banks seems the clearest, while the case for allowing  banks to 
hold equity is still somewhat  doubtful. 
36. See Bank  of England  (1990). 
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Our  research  also suggests  some other  possible areas  for change. One 
that is widely discussed is deposit insurance. However, our cross- 
country  analysis suggests that the nature  of deposit insurance  is not a 
particularly  important  determinant  of bank  performance  and  is therefore 
not an urgent  area for reform  from the perspective of enhancing  bank 
performance.  Clearly  the existence of deposit  insurance  creates  a moral- 
hazard  problem  requiring  the close supervision  of banks.  Other  countries 
appear  to have managed  this supervisory  task well; there  is no reason  to 
believe that improved  supervision  cannot be carried  out in the United 
States too, without  overhauling  the insurance  system. 
There is also evidence that adopting  a universal  bank model would 
improve  the efficiency of U.S. banks, although  this argument  does not 
receive direct empirical support  from our analysis. A universal bank 
format  would allow American  banks to realize greater  return  on their 
investments in information  about customers. It might also increase 
competition in some of the financial  markets that banks could enter, 
such as  securities markets. Our study has not dealt directly with 
competitiveness  in such nonbank  markets. 
Our  comparison  of the U.S. banking  system with those in Germany, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom has focused on those aspects of the 
American system that prevent U.S.  banks from forming long-term 
relationships  with customers. Such aspects include  the facts that  equity 
holding by American  banks is limited and that American  bankruptcy 
laws tend to discourage close bank-borrower  relationships. We also 
noted that the U.S. system contains many more banks than do foreign 
countries,  partly  because  of restrictions  on geographical  expansion.  This 
large number of banks may increase competition within some U.S. 
banking  markets,  but  the geographical  fragmentation  within  the banking 
industry  may  create substantial  market  power  for banks  in local markets 
and  may  make  banks  less diversified  and  thus more  likely  to fail. Despite 
these and other differences, however, we have found it difficult  to tell 
from our performance  indicators whether the U.S.  banking system 
performs  worse than  foreign  systems. Comments 
and Discussion 
Benjamin M. Friedman: Banks, like other middlemen, have always 
been something  of an embarrassment  for mainstream  neoclassical eco- 
nomics. Intellects nursed on Walrasian  cream would be much more 
comfortable with an auction-type market in which ultimate savers 
supplied capital directly to ultimate investors. The apparent  need for 
some intermediary  to get in between is at best a challenge, and more 
likely downright  awkward,  depending  on one's point of view. Evidence 
that such middlemen  not only exist but may even be quantitatively 
important,  in determining  either the level of economic activity or its 
allocation,  just makes  matters  worse. 
From  the standpoint  of this conventional  perspective, it is now all the 
more  galling  that  those economies in which  banks  play a greater  role vis- 
a-vis auction-type  securities  markets  than  they do in our own appear  to 
be doing  better  than  ours-and perhaps  for that  very reason.  The subject 
is important  not  just because it is a practically  relevant  matter  of current 
public  policy (bank  reform  is now the lead item on the Bush administra- 
tion's domestic policy agenda)  but also because the questions it raises 
directly  confront  the economist's standard  presumption  favoring  arm's- 
length  dealings, in an open-market  setting, between individually  profit- 
or utility-maximizing  entities. Weakening  or even abandoning  this pre- 
sumption  in turn  creates  a potentially  positive role  for public  policy both 
in establishing  the ground  rules governing  market  structures  and via a 
vast variety  of more  explicitly  dirigiste  policy interventions. 
Allen Frankel  and  John  Montgomery  are on the right  track  in empha- 
sizing  the  relevance-indeed, the  importance-of institutional  structures 
in  general  and  financial  structures  in  particular.  The  central  presumptions 
underlying  their paper are that what happens in the financial  markets 
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can, and under practically relevant circumstances does,  affect real 
economic activity, and, further,  that what happens  in financial  markets 
may depend importantly  on the institutional  structures prevailing in 
those markets.  The illustration  that they offer, based on the "rules and 
practices  governing  the resolution  of the  financial  distress  of customers,  " 
is particularly  apt.  Although  they stop short  of entertaining  the  possibility 
of interventionist  policy actions on an ongoing  basis, they successfully 
highlight  the implications  of their analysis for bank regulatory  policies 
in the sense of setting  the rules  by which private  financial  institutions  go 
about  their  business. 
Along the way, Frankel  and Montgomery  put together  a potentially 
useful array  of detailed information  about how banking  markets  in the 
United  States, the United  Kingdom,  Germany,  and  Japan  are  structured, 
and  especially  about  what  these countries'  banks  have been doing.  Their 
table  4, for example, summarizing  a dozen or so major  features  of these 
countries' respective banking laws, is one of the most helpful such 
compilations  I have seen. In  this  and  other  respects, they have  performed 
a genuine  service. 
They have been less successful, however, in carrying  out the main 
analytical  assignment that they undertake  in their paper-namely,  to 
relate differences in the structures of these four countries' financial 
systems to differences in the performance of their banks, or their 
economies more generally, so  as  to  provide empirical support for 
recommendations  about  public  policy in this area. The basic problem  is 
that despite their efforts in the paper's first substantive section, they 
never succeed either  in establishing  what they mean  by "performance" 
in this context, or in measuring  it. Not surprisingly-it is no accident 
that  the section on "performance"  comes first-this failure  then under- 
mines much of the attempt in the remainder  of the paper to connect 
performance  to market  structure  or to draw  policy conclusions. 
Frankel  and Montgomery  make four different  attempts to measure 
the relative performance  of different  countries' banks. They focus on 
banks'  growth  and  profitability  (including,  conversely, the frequency  of 
bank failures); on the stability of an economy's aggregate business 
investment;  on whether banks are offering standardized  loans to cus- 
tomers or engaging  in more market-oriented  transactions;  and on the 
prevalence  of bankruptcies  among  nonfinancial  corporations.  Alas, each 
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but  flawed  conceptually  as a measure  of the performance  that  matters  in 
Frankel  and  Montgomery's  sense. 
On bank profits: If U.S.  banks had been continuously flush with 
profits  throughout  the last two decades, would we conclude that banks 
were efficiently allocating capital among competing uses, and being 
justly rewarded  for doing so, or would we instead  suspect some kind of 
monopolistic  market  power?  Similarly,  if the United States had  Japan's 
record of literally  zero bank  failures since World  War  II, wouldn't we 
complain  that the regulators  were propping  up inefficient  and unneces- 
sary  institutions? 
On  the stability  of aggregate  business investment:  Frankel  and  Mont- 
gomery show that investment spending  was somewhat more stable in 
the United States than in Germany  or the United Kingdom  (albeit not 
Japan)  during 1970-90, but then emphasize that the reverse was true 
during 1980-90 considered alone. But surely the wider amplitude  of 
fluctuations  in U.S. business investment  in the 1980s  was in large  part  a 
consequence of the successful campaign,  at the outset of the decade, to 
slow U.S. price  inflation.  And, presumably,  transmitting  major  changes 
in the central bank's monetary  policy to the nonfinancial  economy is 
part  of what  banks  are supposed  to do. 
On the nature of bank lending: Frankel and Montgomery  point to 
signs that U.S. banks  have "turned  from offering  standardized  loans to 
customers  with whom they develop long-term  relationships  to engaging 
in more  market-oriented  transactions  using  derivative  securities." Here 
too, even apart  from questions of measurement,  the substance of the 
distinction  is unclear.  The closest that Frankel  and Montgomery  come 
to a concise statement  of what banks are supposed to do-the  perfor- 
mance  to be measured,  if possible-is  that "the major  economic role of 
banks is to make transactions that cannot easily be made in open, 
standardized  markets."  For reasons that  the work  of Ben Bernanke  and 
Mark  Gertler,  as well as that of Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew  Weiss and 
Joseph  Stiglitz  and  Bruce  Greenwald,  has nicely illustrated,  to the extent 
that  banks  are  turning  away  from  long-term  customer  relationships  they 
are failing to fulfill the responsibility that the authors of this paper 
plausibly want them to assume. By contrast, to the extent that the 
loans from which banks are turning  away are standardized,  and hence 
can potentially be packaged and resold in securities markets (like 
"CARS" and "CARDS"), they are doing  just what the authors  think 
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On corporate  bankruptcies:  A more Schumpeterian  view would be 
that irregularly  occurring episodes of financial distress provide the 
modern economy's chief mechanism  for dissolving the commitments 
that often chain resources to their current  use long after  that particular 
application  has ceased to be even economically sensible, much less 
optimal.  Here again,  the role for banks  is two-edged. 
What,  then, is to be done? Frankel  and Montgomery's  policy recom- 
mendations  for the United States strike  me as basically  sound-as  far  as 
they go. Of the three potential policy innovations that they address 
explicitly, the authors  most strongly  favor removing  geographical  bar- 
riers to bank consolidation  (to which they refer as "bank expansion," 
thereby  downplaying  the extent to which it is likely that the number  of 
banks  would  decline  along  the way);  they also favor  introducing  a system 
of creditor  committees  to enable  banks  to cope with  the financial  distress 
of domestic business borrowers  in a manner  more nearly resembling 
what now happens when developing countries cannot meet their obli- 
gations;  and they shy away from granting  U.S. banks authority  to hold 
equity positions in  nonfinancial businesses (presumably their cus- 
tomers')  as do their  Japanese  and German  counterparts. 
By contrast, Frankel  and Montgomery  turn away from some of the 
larger  issues that  are, orat least ought  to be, central  to current  discussions 
of bank  reforms.  For example, they rightly  emphasize  the way in which 
keiretsu relationships  provide financial stability underneath  Japanese 
product  and  factor markets,  and this is the basis for their  at least raising 
the question of whether U.S.  banks should be allowed to own their 
customers' equity. (Carl  Kester's recent book on corporate  finance in 
Japan  likewise emphasizes  the importance  of the keiretsu  structure,  but 
unlike  Frankel  and Montgomery,  Kester argues  that  these relationships 
are now visibly weakening.)'  But they do not entertain  the possibility  of 
equity cross-ownership  between banks and nonfinancial  firms in the 
opposite direction-that  is,  commercial or industrial firms' owning 
banks-which  is the live part  of this issue in the context of the current 
bank  reform  debate in the United States. Similarly,  Frankel  and Mont- 
gomery  do not  examine  the parallel  role of government,  both  in providing 
a security  backstop in the event of financial  distress and in providing  a 
source of coordination  and  guidance  that is absent in a setting  of arm's- 
length market interactions. Would the U.S.  economy benefit if the 
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federal government extended to nonfinancial  businesses a safety net 
more  nearly  comparable  to that  available  for banks?  Would  the increase 
in government  intervention  that naturally  goes along with this kind of 
insurance  role (for example, advising banks on credit allocations) be 
beneficial?  Even if so, would it be acceptable  in the American  political 
and social context? The authors  do not address  such larger  issues. 
Ironically,  just as more U.S. airlines  today operate  as explicit wards 
of the court or at least with the potential  protection  of the bankruptcy 
code as an active consideration  in their  business  than  was the case before 
the major  airline  deregulation  of a decade or so ago, most U.S. financial 
institutions  are  more  dependent  on the  government  today  than  they were 
before the recent movement of bank and other depository institution 
deregulation  began. Was  this outcome  predictable,  either  on the basis of 
economic  theory  or  from  the array  of cross-country  factual  comparisons 
documented in this paper? Does it represent a regularity  that bears 
potentially  important  implications  about  the likely  consequences  of bank 
reforms now under discussion? Questions like these are what the 
discussion of bank  reform  now ought  to be all about. 
For example, on the basis of the cross-country comparisons they 
provide, Frankel  and Montgomery  dismiss potential  changes in deposit 
insurance  as being of little import. (This conclusion is consistent with 
their exclusive focus on banks as allocators of credit. It remains  true, 
however, that banks  can create credit-that  is, acquire  assets-only  as 
they take on liabilities, so that the insurance  status of those liabilities  is 
important  even within  the context of Frankel  and Montgomery's  notion 
of bank  performance.)  Their stated reason for dismissing  the relevance 
of differences in deposit insurance  is the assumption  that appropriate 
supervision  arrangements  and  standards  can readily  compensate  for any 
given differences in deposit insurance, leaving no net implication  for 
banks' performance.  But  just as the more directive role of government 
that parallels the keiretsu system in Japan may be neither politically 
acceptable  nor practically  feasible in the U.S. context, the kind  of bank 
supervision that recent experience suggests is necessary to prevent 
systemically destructive abuse of current U.S.  deposit insurance ar- 
rangements  may be neither acceptable nor feasible. And if not, then 
reform of bank deposit insurance is very much to the point for the 
authors'  focus on the performance  of banks  as providers  and allocators 
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Another  example  of a large-scale  issue that  is  just beneath  the surface 
in many aspects of the current  debate over bank reform  in the United 
States is the relative merit (and shortcomings)  of the continental-style 
universal  bank. What conclusions should one draw from Frankel  and 
Montgomery's  cross-country  comparisons  about whether U.S. banks 
should  become the nation's principal  underwriters  of corporate  securi- 
ties? Or sell insurance?  Or  act as real estate agents? 
The authors  have provided  a real service by assembling,  clearly and 
compactly, so  many potentially useful facts about the structure of 
banking  markets  in major  countries. Further  research  should  now bring 
this information  to bear on positive questions about how differences  in 
market  structure  affect banks' ability to carry out their intended eco- 
nomic  function, and hence on the major  public  policy issues in this field 
that seem increasingly  urgent. 
Mark Gertler: By just about  any measure, U.S. commercial  banking  is 
in a decline. The ratio of bank assets to GNP has fallen steadily since 
1980.  So too have bank  bond  ratings  and  bank  equity  prices, at least until 
recently. What is going up are bank failures;  and, notably, this rise in 
failures continued unchecked through  the expansion of the 1980s. No 
one is suggesting  that the system is in any danger of a "Depression- 
level" collapse. But there is fear that a sustained  economic slowdown 
could move an already  fragile system one step closer to a savings and 
loan kind of fiasco. It is this climate that provides the motivation  for 
Allen Frankel  and  John  Montgomery's  paper. 
There are two broad issues here. The first one involves positive 
questions:  Where  is the U.S. banking  system headed?  Are commercial 
banks as we know them simply dinosaurs?  Will they transform  them- 
selves into the kind of universal banks that are currently  popular in 
Europe?  The second issue is normative:  Should the decline in banking 
be viewed as simply  the natural  outcome of Darwinian  competition?  Or 
is it, at least in part, the product  of a regulatory  environment  that is ill- 
suited  to the  current  financial  environment,  one that  now includes  intense 
foreign  competition?  If so, what is the appropriate  course of policy? 
These questions  are extremely  difficult  to answer. Empirical  work is 
hampered  because-as  James Tobin taught us long ago-banks  are 
largely  creatures  of the prevailing  regulatory  environment.  This makes 
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environment  changes. As a simple example, zero bank failures in a 
regulated  environment  tells us nothing about the stability of banking 
under laissez-faire. In this context, a reasonable strategy is to try to 
draw  information  from  the experiences  of other  countries.  This  is exactly 
the kind of exercise Frankel  and Montgomery  pursue. In the process, 
they usefully catalogue the facts regarding  the banking  systems of the 
United States, the United Kingdom,  Germany,  and  Japan. 
In sifting  through  the cross-country  evidence, three themes emerge. 
The first is that in the United States, there is a much broader  use of 
arm's-length  financial  arrangements.  Security  issues account  for a rela- 
tively higher percentage of external finance. Situations of financial 
distress are often likely to be resolved through formal bankruptcy 
proceedings.  These features  contrast  with practices in other countries, 
where bank finance is dominant  and where debt renegotiation  is often 
an informal  process involving the active participation  of a bank. The 
authors appropriately  cite differences in legal norms as a key factor 
explaining the differences. Compared  to their Japanese and German 
counterparts,  U.S. banks are limited by the extent to which they can 
(1) participate  in the ownership  and management  of nonfinancial  firms 
and (2) take the initiative  in renegotiating  debt. A key punch  line is that 
so long as these legal norms remain intact, differences are going to 
remain  between the U.S. system and others. It is unlikely,  for example, 
that U. S. banks  could ever evolve into the exact universal  form  popular 
in Germany. 
But why do we care?  In my view, a key issue is which kind  of system 
best insulates  the economy against  the possible consequences of finan- 
cial distress. The Japanese and German  systems facilitate the restruc- 
turing  of loans to firms  in distress. Heavy bank involvement simplifies 
the process of renegotiation.  A compensating  factor  in  the United  States, 
however, is the widespread  use of equity and, more  recently, the use of 
debt with equity-like  features. Equity  financing  provides an alternative 
way for firms  to make the required  financial  adjustments  in periods of 
low earnings;  that  is, they may simply  cut dividends.  And, while not yet 
''equity-in-drag,"  innovations in the bond market  have increased the 
flexibility of arm's-length  debt. It is therefore an open question as to 
which kind of financial  system is best. Indeed, the incentive effects of 
deposit insurance may be another  factor weighing in the favor of the 
U.S. system. Because deposit insurance  subsidizes risk-taking,  it may 
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A second theme that emerges from the paper is that banking  in the 
United  States is considerably  more  decentralized  than  in the other  three 
countries  examined. A product  of the limits on the geographical  diver- 
sification  of U.S. banks  is a much  higher  failure  rate. Since this issue has 
such important  policy implications, it would be interesting  to gather 
evidence beyond the basic aggregate  statistics provided  in the paper. I 
think  casual empiricism  suggests that the last two banking  crises in the 
United States were associated with regional  declines:  first  the recession 
in Texas; then the downturn  in New England. It would be useful to 
gather  data on individual  bank losses over this period and then match 
the data  with the evidence on sectoral  shocks. 
Some preliminary  numbers  are consistent with the "regional  distur- 
bances"  story. A recent article from the New  York  Times suggests that, 
of the banks  carrying  nonperforming  loans equal  to 8 percent  or more  of 
total assets, 70 percent are concentrated  in New England.  In addition, 
banks  in New England  and  Texas account  for the vast majority  of those 
with  capital  positions  below the minimum  regulatory  requirement.  These 
statistics  suggest  that  easing  restrictions  on interstate  banking  may  allow 
banks to better insulate themselves against regional  disturbances  and 
may help develop a more resilient national banking system. Clearly, 
obtaining  more  data  on this issue would be desirable. 
The third  theme that emerges from this paper  is that financial  safety 
nets do not seem to differ significantly  across those countries in the 
sample. Each country offers a fairly comprehensive form of deposit 
insurance. Minimum capital requirements apply throughout, as  do 
reserve  requirements.  And, for better  or worse, each country  abides by 
some form  of a "too-big-to-fail"  doctrine.  The main  implication  of these 
facts is that explaining  the relative  performance  of the various  banking 
systems means looking elsewhere; cross-country differences in the 
financial  safety net cannot  provide  an explanation. 
This conclusion begs the following question: Why has the U.S. 
banking system performed so poorly in the  1980s, especially when 
compared  to the performance  in the other sample countries? I think 
providing  an answer  to this question  is central  to the authors'  investiga- 
tion. Appealing  to interstate  banking  restrictions  alone is insufficient, 
since these restrictions  existed well before this time. The paper does 
make  reference  to the Latin  American  debt  crisis, but  it is hard  to believe 
that this factor alone is responsible. The paper  omits any discussion of 
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event was unimportant.  Correspondingly,  the sharp  rise in interest  rates 
in the 1980s  is probably  also relevant. Overall,  I think  it would be useful 
to trace the impact of various macro shocks occurring  in the 1980s  on 
the financial  systems of each country in order  to gain some insight  into 
how each system handles potential  financial  distress. Tracing  through 
the impact  of regulatory  changes  would similarly  be useful. 
In addition to developing some basic facts, the authors attempt to 
provide some measures of the relative performance  of each banking 
system. Unavoidably,  this  exercise opens a can  of worms.  Ben Friedman 
has discussed the various  problems  in his comments. The basic issue is 
identification:  the problem of separating  the effects of the regulatory 
system from  the effects of the macroeconomy. 
The most direct way to measure efficiency is to examine the gap 
between price and marginal  cost. In the context of banking,  this gap is 
reflected  by the differences  between the loan rate and the deposit rate. 
True, because loans are not standardized  this gap is an imperfect 
measure. Nonetheless, this kind of measure may be less sensitive to 
some of the identification  problems that plague the indexes that the 
authors  provide. 
Overall,  this paper  provides  a useful summary  of the banking  systems 
of four major countries. It also provides a convincing story of how 
differences  in legal systems help account for the differences  in banking 
systems. The performance  measures  offered, though, suffer  from  prob- 
lems of identification. Finally, the paper offers some evidence that 
confirms  my priors  that the interstate  banking  laws in the United States 
should  be reformed,  though  admittedly  the standards  for confirming  my 
priors  are weaker  than  the standards  required  to shift them. 
General Discussion 
John Shoven and Robert Litan both felt that a discussion of banks' 
problems  should have examined  the consequences of the deregulation 
of the thrift  industry.  Shoven noted that in the 1980s  banks  were forced 
to compete with savings and loans, which offered similar services. 
Strapped  for cash, many of the thrifts offered desperately high rates. 
Litan offered some calculations  on the pressure this rate competition 
exerted on banks. In the late 1980s, out of a total of $4 trillion  of total 
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by insolvent  or extremely  weak  banks  or thrifts.  He guessed that  interest 
rate competition from weak institutions added 15 basis points to the 
interest  rates  on bank  deposits, and  another  15  basis points  of cost came 
from  increased  deposit  insurance  premiums  resulting  from  bank  failures. 
Only  part  of this 30  basis point  increase  in costs could  be passed  forward. 
Since banks earn 75 basis points in a good year, failures have had a 
dramatic  effect on profits  in the American  banking  system. 
Litan  argued  that  differences  in the structure  of banking  systems help 
explain differentials  in performance  across countries. A financial  sys- 
tem's ability to allocate resources is one good indicator  of its perfor- 
mance. The thrift  crisis has cost about $200 billion and, he estimated, 
bank  failures  during  the 1980s  and  early 1990s  will cost an additional  $60 
billion. Losses of this magnitude,  which can be attributed  to a failure  of 
supervision and regulation, indicate very poor performance.  He also 
noted that Norway and Japan  are facing similar  problems  among their 
thrift  institutions. 
Richard  Cooper  foresaw some serious  potential  problems  associated 
with widening  the scope of banking  activities that the authors did not 
explicitly address. With regard  to selling as opposed to underwriting 
insurance, the synergies would come from shared overhead-for  ex- 
ample,  offering  mortgage  loan insurance  with  a mortgage.  Since he knew 
of no law  prohibiting  an  insurance  company  from  using  a bank's  facilities, 
Cooper reasoned that the actual synergies must be few. In the case of 
underwriting  securities, Cooper was concerned by problems  resulting 
from self-dealing.  He reported  that in small  European  countries, where 
underwriting  securities  is allowed, bankers  told him  that  what  restricted 
self-dealing  was the threat of being ostracized from the financial  com- 
munity  if one were found  out. He doubted  that  this would  be an effective 
deterrent  in the United  States. Benjamin  Friedman  added  that,  according 
to U.S. underwriters  competing  in European  markets, some European 
banks do at times engage in practices that would be considered self- 
dealing  in the United States. However, he noted that the potential  for 
these practices already  exists in U.S. securities firms, so that it would 
not add a whole new problem here if banks also began to underwrite 
securities.  Cooper  responded  that  a person  dealing  with  a securities  firm 
understands  there  are  risks, but  it is important  for  banks  to be institutions 
where financially  unsophisticated  people can save without risk. Litan 
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from  buying  any securities  that  were underwritten  by an affiliate  and  felt 
that  the risk  of self-dealing  by banks  could be handled  by legislation. 
The importance  of bankruptcy  laws and attitudes was discussed. 
Shoven observed  that  bankruptcy  has become much  more  attractive  for 
corporations  in the 1980s and was therefore less of a sign of financial 
distress than it had been in the past. Litan cited a recent article in 
U.S. News and World  Report (April  8) which stated that since loans to 
bankrupt  companies acquire senior status, the size and strength of 
companies filing for Chapter 11  made these loans ".  ..  about the safest 
kind  of lending  you can imagine."  Gary  Saxonhouse  found  the authors' 
discussion of Japanese bankruptcy practices somewhat misleading. 
Their figure 3, which shows the trend in bankruptcies  for the four 
countries,  uses indexes with a common  base of 1975.  In 1975  there  were 
five times as many bankruptcy  cases in Japan  as in the United States. 
He observed that even though there is more stigma attached to bank- 
ruptcy in Japan than in the United States, it is not unheard of for 
corporations,  even with assets over $1 billion,  to file for bankruptcy. Allen B. Frankel and John D. Montgomery  309 
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